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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law: Partial unconstitutionality: Unconstitutional application of statutes.- Borchert v. City of Ranger, 42 F. Supp. 577 (N. D.
Tex. 1941), though not a leading case, raises an interesting problem. Jehovah's Witnesses sued to enjoin future prosecutions for violation of ordinances
which forbade all peddling without a license from certain officials. The court
granted the injunction on the ground that the ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is not the purpose here to discuss the substantive
law of this case or of any case mentioned. judge Wilson raised the problem
to be dealt with here when he said,' "I am not holding that these ordinances
of the various defendant cities are invalid. They may be perfectly valid and
enforceable against certain activities that may be carried on in their midst.
*

.

. I am holding as to these plaintiffs, there was an unconstitutional appli-

cation of these ordinances to them."
The question of whether a statute which will be unconstitutional when
applied to a certain set of facts but constitutional when applied to others,
should be declared totally void or whether it should be upheld as far as possible, has received a rather confusing treatment at the hands of the Supreme
Court of the United States, perhaps because this question in most cases has
been incidental to the decision of the major issue in the specific case under
consideration. An orderly analysis of the decisions on this issue is difficult,
but one can distinguish with reasonable certainty between federal statutes
and state statutes.
The most clearly defined series of cases involving federal statutes began
with United States v. Reese2 which was a prosecution under a statute forbidding discrimination by an election official and influencing an election.
Without discussing the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court held
that the statute embraced subjects beyond the control of the federal government and so was unconstitutional. The court refused to limit the statute by
construction to subjects over which the federal government properly could
exercise its authority. Four years later, the court refused to limit a law
punishing the counterfeiting of trade marks to counterfeiting in interstate
commerce,3 but they discussed the intention of Congress, as well as making
the broad statement that they would not limit by construction the application4
of a general statute. However, the broad rule was approved in later cases,
until in Yu Cong Eirg v. Trinidad3 the court said, referring to the Reese
and subsequent cases, "The effect of the authorities we have quoted is clear
to the point that we may not in a criminal statute reduce its generally inclusive
terms so as to limit its application to only that class of cases which it was
142 F. Supp. 577 at 582.
292 U. S. 214, 23 L ed. 478 (1875).
STrade
Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. ed. 550 (1879).
4
James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 23 Sup. Ct. 678 (1903); Baldwin v. Franks, 120
U. S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656 (1887) ; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 1 Sup. Ct.

601 (1882).
5271 U. S. 500, 46 Sup. Ct. 619 (1926).

This was a Philippine statute, but the Supreme
Court felt that they were not bound by the construction placed upon it by the Philippine
court.
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within the power of the legislature to enact, and thus save the statute from
invalidity." 6
While all the above cases have involved criminal statutes, and while general
statements of this doctrine generally limit it to criminal laws, other cases
have held that a general statute can not be limited by construction so as to
save its constitutionality. In United States v. Ju Toy, 7 an alien exclusion
case which the court insisted was not criminal, Mr. Justice Holmes said,
by way of dictum, 8 that the section making findings of fact by administrative

officers final, must be valid in every application, or it would be void in its
entirety. And in the Employers Liability Cases,9 the court refused to limit
a statute, making common carriers engaged in interstate commerce liable to
any of its employees, to employees engaged in interstate commerce. However,
Mr. Justice Moody, dissenting, pointed out that a law must be construed so
as to be constitutional, if this is possible, and distinguished the Reese and
other cases on the ground that they concerned clear statutes where there was
no room for construction. Mr. Justice Moody seems to have more support
in later decisions than does the majority.
The rule that the court, where it is possible, should construe a statute so
as to avoid unconstitutionality and even to avoid grave constitutional doubts,
is well established.' 0 In the Abby Dodge," the United States was seeking
to enforce a fine for violating a statute which forbade bringing into the
United States sponges taken in the Gulf of Mexico or the Straits of Florida.
The statute would have been unconstitutional if applied to sponges taken
within the territorial waters of a state, so the law was construed as not applying to this class of sponges. The Court stated that a statute must be construed
so as to be constitutional, if possible, and permitted the United States to
amend the libel so as to conform to the statute as construed. In Texas v.
Eastern Texas R.R. Co.,'2 a statute allowing a railroad to abandon its lines
after getting a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission, was
construed as not permitting abandonment of its intrastate business, and in
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,' 3 the National Labor Relations
Act was construed as applying only to transactions directly affecting interstate
commerce. In United States v. Walters,14 a criminal statute was limited by
construction. A statute which made it a crime to conspire to present for,
6
1d. at 522. The doctrine of the Reese case also has been applied to administrative
orders. Where part of the order goes beyond the powers of the administrative body, the
whole order had been declared void in Illinois Central R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U. S.
514, 27 Sup. Ct. 153 (1906) and United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy, 10 F. Supp. 995
(D. Mass. 1935).
7198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905).
8Id. at 262, 25 Sup. Ct. at 646.
9207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141 (1908).
10N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 6Z, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 296 (1932); Texas v. Eastern
Texas R. R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 42. Sup. Ct. 281 (1922): The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S.
166, 32 Sup. Ct. 310 (1912) ; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366,
29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1909).
"1223 U. S. 166, 32 Sup. Ct. 310 (1912).
12258 U. S. 204, 42 Sup. Ct. 281 (1922).
'1301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
14263 U. S.15, 44 Sup. Ct. 10 (1923)
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or to obtain, payment of a fraudulent claim against any corporation in which
the United States was a stockholder, was construed as meaning corporations
which were instrumentalities of the government, Mr. Justice Holmes saying,' 5
"But against the cases that decline to limit the generality of words in order
to save the constitutionality of an act are many others that imply a limit, and,
when the circumstances permit, the latter course will be adopted."' 6
In cases where no constitutional problem was raised, the Supreme Court
has not hesitated to limit a statute by construction. In United States v.
Palmer,1 7 a statute declaring murder or robbery by any person on the high
seas to be piracy, was not applied to a foreign subject on a foreign vessel,
and in Holy Trinity Church z. United States,1s a statute making it unlawful
fo any person or corporation to transport aliens to this country under contract to perform labor or services of any kind, was construed not to include
a contract to become pastor of a church. Both these were criminal statutes.
The decisions were based mainly on the intention of the legislature, but the
cases applying the Reese doctrine have asserted that there was no power in
the court to limit a general statute by construction, with very little discussion
of legislative intention.
The decisions are thus conflicting on the question whether a federal statute
which is too general can be saved and applied in cises which fall within
Congressional power. 19 While the cases supporting the Reese doctrine can
be dismissed on the theory that the statutes were so clear as to leave no
room for construction, 20 the statutes have differed but little. It is the approach
of the court that has changed. 2 1 Or the theory of the Reese case may continue
to be applied to criminal statutes which are to be strictly construed,2 2 and
disregarded in remedial statutes which receive a liberal construction. It is
doubtful whether the present court would say that it had no 23power to limit
a general remedial statute to its proper scope by construction.
1561d. at 18, 44 Sup. Ct. at 11.
' in United States v. Gramlich, 19 F. Supp. 422 (S. D. Ill. 1937), the Anti- Racketeering Act, which covered acts in any way affecting commerce, was construed to mean only
acts which materially interfered with commerce, in order to save its constitutionality.
173 Wheat. 610 (LT. S.1818).
18143 U. S.457, 12 Sup. Ct. 528 (1892).
19 In El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 30 Sup. Ct. 21
(1909), the Federal Employers Liability Act was applied to an injury in a territory,
after it had been declared unconstitutional in regard to interstate commerce. Territories
and interstate commerce, however, were separately mentioned. But cf. Butts v. Merchants
& Miners Transportation Co., 230 U. S.126, 33 Sup. Ct. 964 (1913) where there was a
single
general clause. In both cases the intention of Congress was discussed.
2
OSee Employers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 504, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 148 (1908)
(dissenting
opinion).
21
See cases cited supra note 10.
22
Another point in support of the refusal to limit criminal statutes by construction
is the requirement that criminal statutes be definite. See note (1935) 21 CORNELL L. Q.
100, 104. Was the statute sufficiently definite in United States v. Walter, 163 U. S.15,
44 Sup. Ct. (1923), when construed to apply to an attempt to defraud a corporation which
was an instrumentality of the United States.
23
The approach to the National Labor Relations Act has been that the statute covers
only matters within the power of Congress, and each case is tested by its facts to see
whether it is within the statute. Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup.
Ct. 650 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct.
615. (1937).
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In dealing with state statutes, the Supreme Court has been much more
hesitant to declare the entire statute void because of actual or possible uncon24
stitutional applications. In Ratteman v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
a state tax on receipts of the company was enjoined as to receipts from interstate commerce, but was allowed to stand as to receipts from intrastate business, 25 and in Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. z. Anderson,26 a statute allowing
the owner of livestock a double recovery against a railroad which failed to
pay after notice of injury to the stock, was upheld when the action and
judgment equaled the demand, although it had been declared unconstitutional
as applied to a case where action and judgment were for less than the
demand. 27 The problem in these cases seems only to be whether separate
applications of the statute are possible. This is well illustrated by Bourntan
v. Continental Oil Co.,28 where the constitutionality of a state excise tax on
each gallon of gasoline sold, and of a state license tax on distributors of gasoline, was attacked. The court enjoined collection of the excise tax on interstate
sales, while allowing collection on other sales, but the entire license tax was
declared unconsfitutional, since the dealers made sales in both interstate and
intrastate commerce, and the court could see no way in which to divide the
sum. Thus, although the facts before the court show a possible unconstitutional application of the law, the Supreme Court will generally allow a statute
to be enforced, if this is possible, in its other proper applications. 29
Where the law as applied to the parties before the court is valid, the
Supreme Court will not declare it unconstitutional because of possible improper applications. The Court will consider only the facts before it, and
presumes that the state court, whose power it is to construe state statutes, will
construe the statute so that it will be constitutional. In Hatch v. Reardon,"°
Mr. Justice Holmes declared that,3 1 "Unless the party setting up the unconstitutionality of the state law belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given, or the class primarily protected, this court
does not listen to his objections, and will not go into imaginary cases, notwithstanding the seeming logic of the position that it must do so, because if
for any reason, or as against any class embraced, the law is unconstitutional,
it is void as to all. If the law is valid when confined to the class of the party
before the court, it may be more or less of a speculation to inquire what
exceptions the state court may read into general words, or how far it may
sustain an act that partially fails. With regard to taxes, especially, perhaps
it might be assumed that the legislature meant them to be valid to whatever
extent they could be sustained. .. "
24127 U. S. 411, 8 Sup. Ct. 1240 (1887).

25
Accord, Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 12 Sup. Ct. 806 (1891);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472, 10 Sup. Ct. 161 (1889).
26233
U. S.325, 34 Sup. Ct. 599 (1914).
27
St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, .224 U. S. 354, 32 Sup.
Ct. 493 (1911).
28256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606 (1920).
29
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 28?. 42 Sup. Ct. 106 (1921) ; Petition
of Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384 (1889) ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S.
270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903 (1884).
30204 U. S. 152, 27 Sup. Ct. 188 (1907).
31Id. at 160, 27 Sup. Ct. at 190.
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Although the doctrine that the Court will consider only the facts before it,
is well established in civil cases,3 2- Mr. Justice Murphy raised some doubt
about criminal cases in Thornhill v. Alabama,3" when he held a state antipicketing statute void on its face, saying,3 4 "Proof of an abuse'of power in
the particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas."
However, in Watson v. Buck,3 5 the Court, in dealing with the Florida antitrust law, reaffirmed the doctrine that it would limit itself to the facts of
the particular case before it, unless the law was obviously bad.
Whenever the Supreme Court goes beyond the facts of the case before it,
however, it seems that it is taking a dangerous step. The construction of
state statutes is the province of the state courts, and it has been presumed6
that the state legislature and courts will act in a constitutional manner.3
When the case arises in a federal court and thus there is no chance for state
construction, the presumption that the state legislature intended to act in a
constitutional manner still applies.37 For the Supreme Court to go beyond
the facts of the case before it, and construe a general statute, and then
declare it unconstitutional, seems an invasion of the functions of the state
courts, and one not necessary to protect private rights.
The Supreme Court in dealing with state statutes, will ordinarily save the
constitutionality of a general statute, although it has been improperly applied
in the case before it. It will not speculate on possible invalid applications
where there is not illegality in the case before it. The principal fault to be
found in their approach to this problem, and certainly in their approach to
federal statutes, is that legislative intent is apparently of little weight. It
would seem that no definite rules should be laid down on the subject.
Rather, the question whether a general statute should be held partially valid
when it can not be constitutionally applied to certain, facts but can be applied
to others, should be governed almost entirely by legislative intent.
Kenneth. A. Tifft

Federal Natural Gas Act: Effect on interrelation of state and federal
regulation.-Until Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act' in 1938, the regulation of the natural gas industry was left to the states. 2 The Interstate Com32

Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U. S. 114, 42 Sup. Ct. 434 (1922); Yazoo &

Mississippi Valley R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 226 U. S. 217, 33 Sup. Ct. 40 (1912); Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 27 Sup. Ct. 188 (1907).
33310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).

34d. at 97, 60 Sup. Ct. at 741. "

35313
U. S. 387, 61 Sup. Ct. 962 (1941).
3
6St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99 (1914);
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 34 Sup. Ct. 493 (1914) ; WdltersPierce
37 Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518 (1900).

Prouty v. Coyne, 55 F. (2d) 289 (D. So. Dak. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 289

U. S. 704, 53 Sup. Ct. 658 (1932).
'52

STAT.

§ 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1938).

-For an excellent discussion of the regulation of the natural gas industry before the
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merce Act had specifically excepted from its provisions the transportation of
of natural gas by pipe line.3 The federal action in 1938 was prompted primarily by the inability of the states to adequately regulate the natural gas
industry because of the fact that strictly interstate features were beyond the
reach of state regulation. 4 These interstate features of the natural gas industry
had become increasingly accentuated by the comparatively recent improvements in the transmission of natural gas over considerable distances.
Congress delegated to the Federal Power Commission the task of administering the Natural Gas Act. The Commission was given jurisdiction and regulatory control over the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,
over the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for ultimate public consumption, and over the natural gas companies engaged in such transportation
or sale. 5 The Commission's control over these subjects has been held to be
exclusive and state action forbidden." The Act expressly provides that it
does not apply to any other transportation or sale of gas, or to the local distribution of natural gas, or to the facilities used for the production or gathering of natural gas. 7
The Natural Gas Act came before the United States Supreme Court for
the first time in the recent case of Illinois Natural Gas Company v. Central
Illinois Public Service Company.3 The point at issue in this case was the

validity of an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission compelling the
Illinois Natural, Gas Company to extend its facilities to connect with those
of the complainant, an intrastate company distributing natural gas. The defendant was a subsidiary of a large pipe line company, which owned and operated a pipe line system extending through several states. The appellant's
pipe lines were connected with those of its parent corporation but were wholly
within Illinois. It received and transported natural gas within Illinois and
sold the gas to local distributing plants. The Illinois Commerce Commission,
on these facts, found that the appellant was engaged in intrastate commerce
and based its order on this finding.. This was affirmed in the Illinois Supreme
Court on the ground that in the transportation the local interest was paraenactment of the Federal Natural Gas Act, see Howard, Gas and Electricity in Interstate
Commerce (1934) 18 MiNN. L. REv. 611. For a discussion of the State Taxation of
natural gas transported in interstate commerce, see Hedrick, State Taxation of Natural
Gas Transported in Interstate Commerce (1938) 4 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 24.
324 STAT. § 379 (Hepburn Amendment 1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (b) (1926).
4
Howard, Gas and Electricity in Interstate Commerce (1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 611, 660.
Cf. Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 836, 16 U. S. C. 791 (1935).
552 STAT. § 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1938). The constitutionality of the Act was sustained in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Federal Power Commission, 120 F.
(2d) 627 (C. C. A. 7th 1941).
OIt has been held that where the established course of business was predominantly interstate a state commission has no power of regulation simply because some of the gas
is sold in the state of origin. Kentucky Natural Gas. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky, 28 F. Supp. 569 (E. D. Ky. 1939), aff'd, 119 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A.
6th 1941). Cf. Peoples Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 270 U. S.
550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371 (1925), for the situation before the Natural Gas Act.
7
SUp.ra note 5
8'44-U. S.34-, 62 Sup. Ct. 384, 86 L. ed, 322 (1941).
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mount and the national interest was indirect and of minor importance.9 The
appellant contended that it was engaged in interstate commerce and was
subject to the provisions of the Federal Natural Gas Act and that under this
act only the Federal Power Commission could issue such an extension order.' 0
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, on the ground that the federal act applied to the wholesale distribution of natural gas in interstate commerce to the exclusion of state regulation." The Court pointed out that under all former tests the appellant
was engaged in interstate commerce as it made the first sale to the distributor
after the gas was brought into the state ;12 that the proposed extension was
closely related to interstate commerce in that it would affect the volume of
gas moving into the state and its distribution among the states ;13 and that
Section 7c of the Natural Gas Act 14 applied, since the communities to which
the facilities were to be extended were supplied by two companies and constituted a market already served within the meaning of that section.
In determining that the appellant was engaged in interstate commerce, the
Court applied tests derived from cases decided prior to the enactment of the
Natural Gas Act, but it failed to point out that there is some conflict among
these older cases. This is important because the extent of the Commission's
powers turns largely on what is interstate commerce within this field. The
9375 Ill. 634, 32 N. E. (2d) 157 (1941).
15 U. S. C. § 717f (1938).

The following factors are considered by
the Federal Power Commission in determining whether an extension should be permitted: (1) whether the applicant has a supply of natural gas adequate to meet the
demands which it is reasonable to assume would be made upon it; (2) whether there
existed in the territory proposed to be served, customers who could reasonably be expected to use such gas service; (3) whether the facilities proposed to be constructed
would be adequate to meet the estimated demands for gas in the area; (4) whether the
applicant possessed adequate financial resources with which to construct the facilities
proposed; (5) whether the cost of construction of the facilities proposed was adequate
and reasonable; (6) whether rates proposed to be charged were reasonable, comparing
in that connection the proposed rates with those of natural gas companies already serving the territory. In re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N. S.) 321 (1939).
It has been held that under this section the Commission may properly impose, in the
interest of the public to be served, reasonable conditions upon the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a gas pipe line. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 113 F. (2d) 281 ( C. C. A. 5th
1940).
"lRe East Ohio Gas Co., 28 P. U. R. (N. S.) 129 (1939) ; Re Behlings Gas Co., 35
P. U. R. (N. S.) 321 (1940). In these two cases the Federal Power Commission held
that under the Natural Gas Act it has jurisdiction over gas companies which, like the
appellant, operate wholly within a state, and sell natural gas moving in interstate commerce
at wholesale to local distributors.
' 2 Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1918) ; cf.
Missouri
ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
3
1 0n this ground the commerce could be regulated by the federal authority as a
matter affecting interstate commerce. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20,
32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911); Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34
Sup. Ct. 833 (1913) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 65 Sup. Ct. 451 (1940).
1452 STAT. § 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (1938). This section prohibits the extension of
facilities by one natural gas company into a market in which natural gas is already
being supplied without first obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Federal Power Commission.
1052 STAT. 824,

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 27

cases prior to the Natural Gas Act arose before Congress had acted and the
issues, therefore, concerned the extent of the states' power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause. In deciding these cases the Court developed two broad
tests. The first was a mechanical test which was concerned with the point
in time and space where the interstate commerce ends and the intrastate commerce begins. 15 The other test considered the nature and purpose of the
state regulation and its effect on interstate commerce.' 6 Under these tests"1
it had been held that where the one putting the gas into interstate commerce
transported and sold it directly to the local consumer the whole transaction
was in interstate commerce, but that the ultimate distribution was local in
nature and, therefore, the state could regulate the rate in the silence of Congress.' 8 In the East Ohio Gas Compan3' 9 case the Court disapproved this
position in part and held that where natural gas was supplied directly to the
consumer, the stepdown in pressure when the gas was passed into the local
distribution mains was similar to the breaking of an original package, and
hence the sale to the local consumer was said to be exclusively intrastate
commerce.
The principal case raises the question of the present significance of the
doctrine of the East Ohio Gas case2 ° under the Natural Gas Act. That case
arbitrarily set the point at which the interstate commerce in gas ends and the
intrastate commerce begins. If it can be said that "intrastate commerce" is
synonymous with "local distribution," as that phrase is used in the Natural
Gas Act, then the extent of the authority of the Federal Power Commission
under the Natural Gas Act will be limited by the application of the East Ohio
Gas Company case. However, the Court in the Illinois Natural Gas Company
case inferred that intrastate commerec and local distribution might not be
15 Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1918);
Missouri ex reL Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas. Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544
(1923); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1930).
16Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279
(1919) ; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 304 U. S. 61,
58 Sup. Ct. 770 (1937).
17In applying these tests, the Supreme Court has held that the transportation of natural
gas through pipe lines, from one state to another, is interstate commerce. Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1918) ; Ozark Pipe Line
Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184 (1924). The interstate commerce character of natural gas in transit from state to state is not affected by transfer of title and
delivery at a state border, where there is no arresting of movement. Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1919); Peoples Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 270 U. S. 550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371 (1925). The sale
to local distributing agents is part of interstate commerce and is not subject to regulation by the states. Missouri ex -el. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298,
44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923) ; State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S.
41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62 (1931). But the sale by the local distributing agent is intrastate
commerce and regulation by the state at the burners' tips is proper. Public Utilities
Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1918) ; East Ohio Gas Co. v.
Tax Commission, 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1930).
IsPennsylvania Gas Co. v., Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct.
279 (1919).
19283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1930).
2Olbid.
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one and the same. After holding that the appellant was engaged in interstate commerce, the Court went on to apply the second test and held that
even if the appellant was engaged in intrastate commerce its activities were
so closely and intimately associatedwith interstate commerce as to come within
the scope of federal regulation as a matter indirectly affecting interstate commerce. 21 This indicates that the regulation of a purely intrastate activity
may be permissible under the Natural Gas Act and that the prohibition of
regulation over local distribution does not prevent regulation of some intrastate features.
It is interesting to note that the effect of this doctrine is to prohibit the state
from control and regulation of an intrastate activity and give to the federal
government, to the extent that Congress has assumed it, complete and exclusive
control over an intrastate activity. This holding continues a phase of a development which began with the Minnesota Rate Case.22 In that case,
after Congress had passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 23 the state legislature fixed certain intrastate railway rates, which
were objected to by interstate carriers as discriminating against and creating
a direct burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld the
rate as a local regulation permissible because of the silence of Congress, since
the Interstate Commerce Act did not purport to deal with the matter directly
but through its administrative organ, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which had not yet acted thereon. Then followed the Shreveport case,24
where the Interstate Commerce Commission, after due hearing, ordered
certain interstate railroad carriers not to transport at rates lower than the
interstate rates, to certain intrastate competing points, i.e. to remove the discrimination against interstate commerce This was upheld by the Supreme
Court as proper Congressional regulation of a matter indirectly affecting interstate commerce, despite the fact that the state commission had set the intrastate
rates.24 A third phase in this development was the decision in the Wisconsin
Rate Case. 5 It was there held that the Interstate Commerce Commission,
under the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act
of 1920,26 had the power to fix intrastate railway rates to remove a disparity
between interstate rates and intrastate" rates which had brought about an unreasonable and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. In the
21Supra
note 13.
22
Simpson v. Shepherd, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151,
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18 (1912).
2324 STAT.

24
Houston
24

§ 379 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).

E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1913).

In the Federal Motor Carriers Act of 1935, Part II, Interstate Commerce Act, 49

STAT.

543, 49 U. S. C. § 301 (1935) Congress specifically provided that the "Shreveport

doctrine" should not apply in the enforcement of that act. See George, The FederalMotor
Carriers
Act of 1935 (1936) 21 CoRNu.. L. Q. 249, 272.
25

Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. Chicago, P. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct.
232, 22 A.L.R. 1086 (1922) ; and in New York v. United States et al., 257 U. S. 591, 42
Sup. Ct. 239 (1922), federal regulatory power was upheld even as against rates fixed
by the charter of the Railroad Corporation as the contract clause of the Federal Constitution does not operate against the United States.
2641 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1929).
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principal case this line of development has been carried one step further, for
in the intrastate railway cases the federal action did not prohibit regulation
27
by the state unless such regulation discriminated against interstate commerce.
But as this second test seems now to be applied under the Natural Gas Act,
regulation by a state over an intrastate activity affecting interstate commerce
is excluded when federal action is permitted.
At present it is difficult to foretell the exact effect the principal case will
have upon the Natural Gas Act. If the Supreme Court follows the trend
indicated in this case there will be a period of adjustment in which the authority of the Federal Power Commission over intrastate activities must be reconciled with the prohibition in the Act against control over the local distribution
of natural gas. On the other hand, it is still possible for the Supreme Court
to recognize that "intrastate commerce" and "local distribution" are synonymous. Should the Court take the latter view, the Federal Power Commission will find its authority limited by the holding of the East Ohio Gas
Company case, to the effect that the intrastate commerce begins at the
time of the stepdown in pressure when the gas is passed into local distribution
mains. Regardless of which way the Court goes, it must be remembered
that certain practical considerations limit the extent to which the federal government should control purely intrastate operations. In general, as the Natu ral Gas Act seems to recognize by its wording, the regulation of local distribution is purely a matter of local28concern and can be accomplished more
satisfactorily by a local commission.
Though the principal case seems correct in result, it is unfortunate that the
Court chose to be so ambiguous. It was not necessary for the decision to
apply the doctrine of "matters affecting interstate commerce," but it would
have been sufficient to have stood on its holding under the first test, that the
appellant was engaged in interstate commerce. By the application of both
tests the Court has created doubt and uncertainty as to the extent of the regulatory control that Congress has delegated to the Federal Power Commission
in the Natural Gas Act.
Richard E. Macey.
27
1n United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941), the Court permitted a regulation of intrastate activities under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
prohibited the introduction into interstate commerce of any product not made under specified conditions set out in the Act. Under this type of regulation the state control is
not completely ousted as the state could set up higher standards and enforce them. See
Note,
(1940) 26 CORN LL L. Q. 464, 469.
2
81n support of local regulation it has been said, "...
that federal regulatory statutes
and the regulatory agencies created thereunder, are to sipplenzent rather than to supersede local state authority." Preston, Regulation of tie Natural Ga Industry (1938) 45
W. VA. L. Q. 250, 257. The principal case clearly shows the possibilities of extensive
intrastate regulation of the natural gas industry by the Federal Power Commission
through an application of the "Shreveport doctrine." This may bring forth a new declaration of legislative policy barring the application of the "matters affecting interstate
commerce" test under the Federal Natural Gas Act to correspond with a similar prohibition in the Federal Motor Carriers Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. §§ 301,
.302 (b) (1935).
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Landlord and Tenant: Damages for holding over where because of illness of tenant there is no liability for rent for another term.-A lease
expired on September 30, 1939, but the tenant remained in possession until
his death on March 7, 1940, the rent having been paid to and including March,
1940. In this proceeding the landlord sought to recover rent from the tenant's estate from April 1, 1940 to September 30, 1940, the claim being based
on two alternative theories: (1) a renewal of the lease for another year beginning October 1, 1939 on the basis of holding over, and (2) damages for
alleged breach of covenant to surrender the premises at the expiration of the
lease, including special damages because of loss of a new tenant to whom a
lease had been given beginning September 30, 1939. In re Weinberg's Estate,
31 N. Y. S. (2d) 445 _(Surr. Ct. 1941).
After the expiration of the lease, and before the tenant's death, the landlord instituted summary proceedings1 in the Municipal Court in order to
recover possession of the premises. The court stayed the issuance of a
warrant to dispossess2 upon its finding that the removal of the tenant, who
suffered from a grave heart ailment, might cause his death. After the expiration of the stay, another Justice extended the decedent's time to vacate the
premises. Both of these orders stipulated that the decedent must pay for
the use and occupation of the premises3 at the rate fixed in the lease.
In holding that the decedent, because of serious illness, did not hold
over within the meaning of the rule which permits the landlord to continue
the lease and collect rent for another year, 4 the decision of the Surrogate
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1410. Summary proceedings provide for removal of the
tenant where he holds over after' the expiration of his term without the consent of the
landlord.
2
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1436a. Where a final order had been granted to recover
possession of premises in the city of New York, the court may stay the issuance of a
warrant and its execution for not more than six months where there would be extreme
hardship to the tenant or his family if not granted. The tenant must deposit with the
court, in a single sum or in installments, the rental money for such an extended period.
A tenant may not waive the provisions of this section.
SAt common law the landlord was entitled to compensation for use and occupation
of the premises after the expiration of a lease. Van Brunt v. Pope, 6 Abb. (N. S.) 217
(1869) ; Abeel v. Radcliffe, 13 Johns, ch. 297 (1816); Comm. of Pitkin County v.
Brown, 2 Colo. App. 473, 31 Pac. 525 (1892) ; Sargent v. Smith, 78 Mass. 426 (1859) ;
note (1925) 38 HARv. L. Ray. 1117. Recovery for use and occupation is now covered
by statute in New York. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 220. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 990
provides that "In an action to recover real property, or the possession thereof, the plaintiff may demand in his complaint, and in a proper case recover, damages for withholding
the property. Those damages include the rents and profits or the value of the use and
occupation of the property where either can be recovered legally by the plaintiff."
4
Where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term the landlord has an election to treat him as a trespasser or as a tenant for another term. Kennedy v. City of
New York, 196 N. Y. 19, 89 N. E. 360 (1909) ; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309 (1873) ;
Lancourse Realty Corp. v. Cohen, 166 Misc. 307, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 437 (Mun. Ct. 1938);
Oussani v. Thompson, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1061 (Sup. Ct. 1897) ; Conway v. Starkweather,
1 Denio 113 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); 1 TIFFANY ON REAL PRoPPRTY (1939) § 175; note
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 1464. By statute, some of the states either have abolished the
rule entirely or have modified it. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5021; VA. CODE (Michie,
1930)§ 5517; Wyo. Rav. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 97-207. Legislation was
proposed by the New York Bar Association that a new section, 230a, be added to the
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is in accord with the rather limited authority on the subject.5
Courts have variously explained the holdover rule as based upon an implied contract, 6 an implied agreement,7 a penalty imposed by law,8 a duty
imposed by law,9 an option implied in law,1 ° an implied condition in the
lease," and' a tacit renovation of the contract implied in law.' 2 But, disregarding terminology, the essence of the liability for rent for a further
term is that it is thrust upon the individual by law, and is quasi-contractual
in nature.' 3 It is not based on a true contract implied from the facts for it
may exist in spite of the tenant's contrary intent,1' or where notice is given
to the landlord that he will not continue as a tenant. 15
Impossibility of performance, normally, is not an excuse for non-performance of an express contract' 6 on the theory that inevitable occurrences7
might be guarded against by stipulation in the agreement of the parties.
An exception' s exists, however, where the liability is not voluntarily underReal Property Law providing that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, only
a tenancy from month to month would arise, where there has been a holdover after a
lease of a year or more under the terms of the previous lease, whether written or oral.
N.5 Y. L. J., March 20, 1937, p. 1389, col. 3.
Herter v. Mullen, 159 N. Y. 28, 53 N. E. 700 (1899); Stewart v. Briggs, 147 App.
Div. 386, 132 N. Y. Supp. 89 (3d Dep't 1911); Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569,
62 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dep't 1900); Weber v. Rogers, 41 Misc. 662, 85 N. Y. Supp.
232 (Sup. Ct. 1903) ; Regan v. Fosdick, 19 Misc. 489, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (Sup. Ct.
1897) ; cf. Mason v. Wierengo's Estate, 113 Mich. 151, 71 N. W. 489 (1897).
OHerter
v. Mullen, supra note 5, at 34.
7
Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 289, 31 N. E. 94 (1892); Greaton v. Smith, 1
Daly
380 (N. Y. 1860) ; Schuyler v. Smith, supra note 4, at 313.
8

United Merchant's Realty & Impr. Co. v. Roth, 193 N. Y. 570, 576, 86 N. E. 544,
5459 (1908).

Herter v. Mullen, supra note 5, concurring opinion per Martin, J., at 43.
' 0 Stern v. Equitable Trust Co., 238 N. Y. 267, 269, 144 N. E. 578 (1924).
"'Herter v. Mullen, supra note 5, concurring opinion per Martin, J., at 44.
12Johnson v. Bjeregaard, 158 Misc. 436, 437, 285 N. Y. Supp. 581, 582 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Right d. Flower v. Darby and Bristow, 1 T. R. 159, 99 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1031 (K. B. 1786).
132 TFFANY ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 1472; note (1933) 19 CORNELL L.
Q. 138, 144, note 32. Although the liability is imposed to induce the tenant to leave the
premises and avoid loss to the landlord, the liability imposed is partially penal since
there is no relation to the damage actually suffered by the landlord, and the rule has
been criticized for its severity in this respect. 1 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (1939) 282.
4
1Conway v. Starkweather, supra note 4, at 115; Clinton Wire -Cloth Co. v. Gardner,

99 Ill. 151 (1881); Haynes v. Aldrich, supra note 7.

l'Schuyler v. Smith, supra note 4, at 314; 805 St. Marks Ave. Corp. v. Finkelstein,

234 App. Div. 15, 253 N. Y. Supp. 785 (2d Dep't 1931) ; 1 Mc ADAM ON LANDLORD AND
TENANT (1934) 103; 6 WLLISToN ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson
1937) § 1856.
16 Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489, 44 N. E. 167 (1896) ; Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N. Y.
456, 37 N. E. 489 (1894) ; Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595 (1891) ; Dexter

v. Norton,
47 N. Y. 62 (1871) ; RESTATEMENT,
7

CONTRACTS

(1932) § 455.

1 Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 107 (1854) ; Herter v. Mullen, supra note 5, at
43, 849.
1 1n the case of express contracts, Professor Williston states that impossibility of
performance is a valid excuse when there is: (1) impossibility due to domestic law,
(2) impossibility due to death or illness in the case of a contract for personal services,
and (3) impossibility due to destruction of the subject matter of the contract. 6 WILLIs-.
TON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1935, and cases cited.
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taken, but is placed upon the individual by operation of law.19 In such a
case, impossibility of performance of the duty for breach of which liability
is imposed-in this case the duty to leave the premises-if occasioned by
an act of Providence, is a valid excuse.20 In other words, the courts have
been unwilling to impose the holdover liability when the tenant's removal is
rendered impossible through no fault of his own.
Although the court correctly refused to impose the quasi-contractual liability in this case, there was, nevertheless, a violation of the tenant's obligation to quit the premises at the end of his term. The question which faced
the court was to determine what other liability, if any, to attach to this conceded breach of duty by the tenant.
One of the normal relational obligations of the landlord and tenant is
that the tenant shall leave the premises at the end of his term,2 1 and where,
as here, there is an express provision in the lease obligating the tenant to
leave at that time, there is a contractual duty as well.
Even in 'the absence of statute,2 2 the landlord could proceed on either of
two theories to obtain reimbursement or damages for the period during
which he was kept out of possession. 23 On the one hand, the landlord is
entitled to use or rental during the time the tenant retains possession.2-4
This, of course, was provided for by the orders of the Municipal Court.
The older authorities held such action for damages to be in the nature of
one for mesne profits.2 More recent authority indicates that the reasonable
value for use and occupation is prima facie equal to the rent reserved by
the lease, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.26 In the alternative,
the landlord may recover damages on the basis of trespass. 27 Although an
19Herter v. Mullen, supra note 5; Matter of Garland, 173 Misc. 832, 19 N. Y. S. (2d)

41120 (Surr. Ct. 1940) ; (1941) 30 ILL. BAR J. 118.
Harmony v. Bingham, supra note 16; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272' (1862);
Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197 (1859) ; Herter v. Mullen, supra note 5; School District

v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530 (1857).

An analogy exists in the doctrine of impossibility in

the case of public or common carriers. The common carrier is relieved of absolute
liability as insurer of the goods carried in the cases of supervening impossibility of per-

formance caused by: (1) act of God, (2) act of the public enemy, (3) act of the shipper,
(4) act of the public authority, and (5) inherent nature of the goods. DOBIE ON BAILMENTS
(1914) § 116.
21
Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276, 284, 4 Sup. Ct. 605, 608 (1883) ; Herter v. Mullen,
supra note 5, at 43; 2 TIFFANY ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 1465; 1 McADAMI
ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1934) § 167; 3 N. Y. LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
E. T. Co. § 961; 16 R. C. L. § 275.
(1937)
22
See supra notes 2 and 3.
23
"It seems to be immaterial for most purposes whether the landlord brings an action
for damages for holding over, or -an action for use and occupation..." 2 TIFFANY, op.
cit.2 supra note 21, 1495.

4See supra note 3.
Sargent v. Smith, 78 Mass. 426 (1859) ; Russell v. Killion, 7 Phila. 110 (Pa. 1868);
ComYN ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1834) 510.
262 TIrFNY op. cit. supra note 21, 1494, and cases cited; (1924) 36 C. J. 63, and
25

cases cited; (1910) 17 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cas. 284; cf. City of Detroit v. Gleason,
116 Mich. 564, 74 N. W. 880 (1898); Williams v. Ladew, 171 Pa. 369, 33 AtI. 329

(1895).
27See supra, note 4.
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action of trespass is possessory in nature and cannot be maintained without
proof of actual or constructive possession, the landlord, after re-entry, is
regarded as having been in possession from the commencement of the
wrong and thus able to recover damages for the withholding of the premises.28 Strictly speaking, the trespasser is not liable for use and occupation, 29 but New York has taken the view that the trespasser is liable in
damages and the amount of recovery is determined by the reasonable rental
value of the property, presumptively the amount provided in the lease.8 0
The fact that the landlord brought summary proceedings originally would
tend to indicate that he had made his election to treat the tenant as a
trespasser. 31
But the landlord in the instant case claimed special damages in excess of
the value of the use and occupation of the premises predicated upon the
loss of a new tenant who had taken a lease of the premises to commence
upon the expiration of the old one. In view of his inability to give possession
to the new tenant, the lessor attempted to placate him by installing him in a
larger apartment at the same rent. The new tenant, however, was not satisfied and left.32 The actual amount lost by the landlord is not disclosed in
the report.
In Herter v. Mullen the court intimated that it might be possible to
recover additional damages from the overholding tenant, even though the
operation of the holdover rule was suspended by impossibility of removal
due to illnessa33
When the tenant fails to relinquish possession at the end of the term
some courts have held that the tenant is liable in damages for resulting
injury to the iandlord,3 4 inclbding.: (a) the loss of an opportunity
28

BIGELOw ON TORTS (8th. ed. 1907)

(1912)
145.
29

375; 1 TIFFANY ON LANDLORD AND TENANT

WooDWARD ON QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) 456; KEENER ON QUAsi-CONTRACTS (1893)
191; Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation, 2 HARV. L. REv. 379, 380 (1889).
30
New York v. Fink, 130 Misc. 620, 224 N. Y. Supp. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; WOODWARD,
op. cit. supra note 29, 457.
SlWhere the landlord makes his election to treat the tenant holding over as a trespasser,

he cannot thereafter make the tenant liable for a further term. Macklin v. McNelton,
63 N. Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Coleman v. Fitzgerald Bros. Brewing Co., 29
Misc. 349, 60 N. Y. Supp. 460 (Sup. Ct. 1899) ; Goldberg v. Mittler, 23 Misc. 116 (Sup.
Ct. 21898) ; Smith v. Maxfield, 9 Misc. 42 (Com. PI. 1894).
3 The report of the case does not indicate the reason why the new tenant gave up
possession. Since the rental was the same for both apartments it is fair to assume that
he was simply dissatisfied rather than unable to meet his obligations financially.
33159 N. Y. at 43: ". . . if the tenant's removal wag rendered impossible by inevitable
accident or the act of God, he is excused for his omission to surrender the premises,

at least so far as it creates a liability for a year's rent which is implied in law." 159 N. Y.
at 45:

". .

follow,

...

. if by reason of their failure to surrender up the premises additional damages

they may be recovered in a proper action so that all damages caused by the

defendant's
misfortune would be borte by them [the tenants] . . ." (italics added).
4

3 Stevens)on v. Peterson, 131 Kan. 690, 293 Pac. 497 (1930); Moore v. Davis, 49
N. H. 45 (1869) ; Russell v. Fabyan, 34 N. H. 225 (1856) ; Bramley v. Chesterton, 2
C. B. (N. S.) 592, 140 Eng. Rep. 548 (1857); 3 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES (1916) §
842; 36 C. J. 62; 16 R. C. L. § 275.
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to let to another, 35 providing the landlord can prove that he could have
leased to another ;36 (b) the cost of removing the tenant's property from the
premises;37 and (c) the expense of litigation in forcing removal of the
tenant.38 One state has made provision by statute for the recovery of
special damages by the landlord. 39 It is apparently well-established in New
York that although the landlord brings summary proceedings against a
tenant, and thereby regards him as a trespasser, 40 this does not cut oft 4 a
recovery in damages for breach of the covenant to surrender the premises. '
In other words, "where the lease has terminated and the tenant has been thereafter removed by summary proceedings, the right of action for a breach of
the covenant to surrender remains in force."' 42 Although the proceedings
for removal were stayed by the Municipal Court in the Weinberg case, and
removal was forestalled by the illness of the tenant, these factors appropriately
relate to the inapplicability of the holdover rule in such a case, but should
have no relation whatever to the breach of duty on the part of the tenant where
actual damage has resulted to the landlord.
Granted that the refusal of the court to apply the holdover rule in this case
is correct, and that the lessor might have collected for use and occupation
if he had elected to do so, should the lessor be limited to this remedy? It
would seem, rather, that it should be possible for the landlord, who is entirely
without fault, 43 to recovr such special damages as he may be able to prove.
Such recovery might be based upon a tort theory, whereby the measure of
damages would be the natural and proximate consequence of the wrongful
breach of duty." Or, since there was an express covenant here involved,
the measure of damages on a contractual basis could be those contemplated
by the parties at the time the agreement was made.45 In either event the
landlord would receive something more than an amount equal to use and
occupation for the period of actual holding over.
35
36Stoddard and Hewett v. Walters, 30 Ark. 156
Watrigant v. Dufort, 28 La. Ann. 892 (1876).
37
Livingston v. Robb, 61 Misc. 81, 113 N. Y. Supp.
38

(1875).

137 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
Bramley v. Chesterton, supra note 34. New York has not, however, allowed recovery by the landlord for the costs of litigation in removing the tenant. .See cases cited,
infra
note 41.
39

VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5517. A tenant for a definite term "shall not, by his
mere failure to vacate the premises upon the expiration of the lease, be held as tenant
for another term when such failure is not due to his wilfulness, negligence or other
avoidable cause, but such tenant shall be liable to the lessor for use and occupation of
the premises and also for any loss or damage sustainwd because of such failure to surrender
possession at the time stipulated." (italics added).
40
Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio 113 (N. Y. 1845).
41
Sullivan v. Ringler & Co., 59 App. Div. 184, 69 N. Y. Supp. 38, aff'd 171 N. Y. 693,
64 N. E. 1126 (1901); Phelan v. Kennedy, 185 App. Div. 749, 173 N. Y. Supp. 687 (1st
Dep't 1919); Vernon v. Brown, 40 App. Div. 204, 58 N. Y. Supp. 11 (2d Dep't 1899) ;
Livingston v. Robb, supra note 37; Marbridge Bldg. Co. Inc. v. White, 115 Misc. 320,
18842 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 386.
Vernon v. Brown, supra note 41, at 205.
43
Mason v. Wierengo's Estate, 113 Mich. 151, 153, 71 N. W. 489 (1897).
441 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES

§ 256.
451 SUTHERLAND,

(1916)

§§ 13, 16; 2

op. cit. supra note 44, at 45.

GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE

(1899)

410
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In jurisdictions in which the lessor is under a duty to put the new tenant
into possession on the expiration of a lease to another party, 46 no questions
beyond those already discussed would seem to be involved. But in some
jurisdictions, as e.g. in New York, 47 it may be necessary to distinguish between a case where the lessor claims loss because the holding over of the
first tenant prevented him from securing another, and a case, like the one
under discussion, where the lessor claims loss because of inability to give
possession to a new tenant who has already signed a lease. Since the rule in
New York is that the lessor is not under a duty to give possession in such
circumstances, 4 the new lessee is the one entitled to maintain ejectment
against the old tenant49 and, where impossibility of removal does not protect
the old tenant, he can recover rent for another year from the ,old lessee, wrongfully holding over, on the theory that he succeeds to the rights of the landlord. 50 It has been held, however, that because of a lack of a landlord and
tenant relationship between the old and new tenants, only the lessor can maintain summary proceedings. 51 In the instant case, then, it would seem that
the new tenant should have brought ejectment or had the lessor bring summary proceedings on his behalf. The lessor, apparently in ignorance of his
rights against the new tenant, accepted a surrender of the lease with the new
tenant5 2 when he was not compelled to do so. 53 Under these circumstances
it may be argued that the landlord is not entitled to special damages. Had
the new tenant instituted the action, the old tenant would still have been al46
Such jurisdictions follow the so-called "English" rule, and include at least the following: Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Philippines, Tennessee, Texas, Canada and England. For cases from each of these
jurisdictions and a general discussion of the problem, see (1931) 70 A. L. R. 151, 153.
47Newy York originated the "American" rule that the lessor impliedly covenants that
the lessee shall have the legal right to the premises and possession will not be withheld
by the lessor or one having paramount title; but there is no implied covenant to put the
tenant in possession as against a third party wrongdoer. United Merchant's Realty and
Improvement Co. v. Roth, 193 N. Y. 570, 86 N. E. 544 (1908) ; Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill
330, 38 Am. Dec. 637 (N. Y. 1842) ; Mirsky v. Horowitz, 46 Misc. 257, 92 N. Y. Supp.
48 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Mechanics' & Traders' Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 2 Hilt. 550
(Com. Pl. 1859). Other jurisdictions which follow the American rule are: California,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey
and Virginia. See (1931) 70 A. L. R. 151. For a general analysis of the English and
American rules, see Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S. E. 824 (1930).
4SSee sipra note 47.
49
Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330, 38 Am. Dec. 637 (N. Y. 1842). For a criticism of
this doctrine see Imbert v. Hallock, 23 How. 456 (N.Y. 1862) and cases cited therein.
6°United Merchant's Realty and Improvement Co. v. Roth, 193 N. Y. 570, 86 N. E.
54451 (1908).
Eells v. Morse, 208 N. Y. 103, 101 N. E. 803 (1913). In an unpublished manuscript
dealing with the New York Real Property Law, Professor Richard R. Powell compares
this case with the one cited in note 50, supra, and concludes that Eells v. Morse ". . . is
a product either of formalistic reasoning or of a liking for the doctrine, existent in some

states, that a landlord is under a duty in all cases to give the tenant not only a right to
possession but possession itself." Cited in JACOBS, CASES AND MATEAaS ON LANDLORD
AND TENANT (1932) 167, note 4 and 169, note 5.
52
The report of the case does not indicate that the landlord made any objections to
the5 3surrender of the premises by the new tenant.
See infra note 56.
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lowed to remain, but the court would have been faced with the question of
what compensation, if any, to award to the new tenant.
Unless the holdover rule can be invoked, the second lessee could not recover rent for another year from the tenant holding over.54 Apparently,
only the landlord has been allowed to recover for use and occupation.5 5 On
the other hand, since the new tenant is still liable for the rent although he is
unable to obtain possession because of the presence of a third person wrongfully in possession,"6 the new tenant would have a strong argument that he
was entitled to a recovery for use and occupation rather than the landlord.
At least, the new tenant can succeed in an action for damages against the
landlord. The measure of damages in such case, where the lessor fails to
give possession, is the difference between the rental value of the premises and
the rent reserved,5 7 together with such necessary expenses incurred by the
lessee in preparing for occupation as were within the contemplation of the
parties. 58 Special damages may be recovered if they are the natural consequence of the failure of the lessor to give possession.5 9 However, from the
incomplete facts stated in the report is cannot be determined whether the
new lessee would be entitled to damages or not.
Tozier Brown

Trusts: Creation and validity: Reservation of control by settlor, when
testamentary?-The owner of property who wishes to create an inter vivos
trust, retaining for his lifetime the income therefrom, power to revoke, alter
and amend, the right to withdr w parts of the corpus and also the right to
54
United Merchants' Realty and Improvement Co. v. Roth, 193 N. Y. 570, 86 N. E.
544 (1908).
55
Supra note 3.
56
Smith v. Barber, 96 App. Div. 236, 89 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1904), on later
appeal, 112 App. Div. 187, 98 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dep't 1906) ; Foreshaw v. Hathway,
112 Misc. 114 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Dodd v. Hart, 30 Misc. 459, 62 N. Y. Supp. 484 (Sup.
Ct. 1900); Ward v. Edesheimer, 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 138, 17 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Corn.
P1. 1892); McKinney v. Holt, 8 Hun 336 (3d Dep't 1876) ; Mechanics' and Traders'
Fire
57 Ins. Co. v. Scott, 2 Hilt. 550 (Com. P1. 1859).
Eastman v. The Mayor, 152 N. Y. 468, 46 N. E. 841 (1889) ; Dodds v. Hakes, 114
N. Y. 260, 21 N. E. 398 (1889); Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 60 (1869); Trull v.
Granger, 8 N. Y. 115 (1853) ; Podalsky v. Ireland, 137 App. Div. 257, 121 N. Y. Supp.
950 (1st Dep't 1910), later appeal, 146 App. Div. 940, 131 N. Y. Supp. (1st Dep't 1911),
aff'd. 210 N. Y. 598, 104 N. E. 1138 (1914); Goldman v. Gainey, 67 App. Div. 330, 73
N. Y. Supp. 738 (3rd. Dep't 1901); Smith v. Barber, supra note 56; 2 TIFFANY ON
LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 547.
58Podalsky v. Ireland, supra note 57; Williamson v. Stevens, 84 App. Div. 518, 82
N. Y. Supp. 1047 (1st Dep't 1903); Oehlhof v. Soloman, 73 App. Div. 329, 76 N. Y.
Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1902) ; Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71, 31 Am. Dec. 283 (1837);
cf. Shultz v. Brenner, 24 Misc. 522, 53 N. Y. Supp. 972 (Co. Ct. 1898).
59
Williamson v. Stevens, 84 App. Div. 518, 82 N. Y. Supp. 1047 (1st Dep't 1903);
Segal v. Bingham Engraving Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1920). Loss of the
use of premises for a particular purpose unknown to the lessor gives no right to damages.
Rothman v. Kosower, 107 N. Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1907). But it may be otherwise if
such special purpose is known to the lessor. Friedland v. Myers, 139 N. Y. 432, 34 N. E.
1055 (1893); Price v. Eisen, 31 Misc. 457, 64 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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dictate all sales, purchases, investments and reinvestments as well as indicate
the ultimate beneficiary after his death, may fail to accomplish his purpose
because of the Statute of Wills.1 The individual who wishes to remain the
absolute owner of his property until death and then direct its subsequent
devolution may do so only by complying with the statutory formalities for
the execution of a will, if it is his intention that no interest whatsoever is to
pass until his death. 2 In spite of this basic principle of law, the trust provides
a medium whereby an individual may retain many of the incidents of absolute
ownership during his lifetime and still effectively direct the ultimate disposition of the property after his death without having executed a will. Often
the line between a trust which is valid and one that violates the Statute of
Wills is shadowy and difficult to draw.3 In discussing the distinction we are
now concerned solely with the quantum of rights and powers which the settlor
may effectively reserve to himself and not with those trusts which run counter
to the Statute of Wills because the beneficiary is not to be determined, or
the trust property is not identified and conveyed to the trustee until after
the death of the settlor. 4 Moreover, cases finding the equivalent of absolute
ownership in the settlor for the purpose of income taxation must be carefully
distinguished from the cases under discussion since in the field of taxation
entirely different principles are controlling.
The pertinent question is: How many rights and powers may the settlor
retain for his life, while indicating the ultimate disposition of the trust property after his death, and still create a trust which is unassailable? A deed
must pass some interest to the grantee or it is not a conveyance at all; so
it is conceivable that .the settlor may retain so many of the incidents of
complete ownership that the purported deed bf trust becomes illusory and is
an attempted testamentary disposition. If one retains title to property and
gives possession of it to another to hold for him and deal with it as directed
and on his death, if not otherwise directed, to deliver it to another person,
Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 521.
Sometimes the deed or instrument expressly states that it is only to take effect at

1Scott,
2

the death of the grantor.

Such instruments have been subject to two interpretations:

(1) That it is an attempted will and therefore invalid. Boon v. Castle, 61 Misc. 474, 115
N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Butler v. Sherwood, 196 App. Div. 603, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 242 (3d Dep't 1921), affd, 233 N. Y. 655, 135 N. E. 957 (1922); Leonard v.
Conard, 145 Mich. 563, 108 N. W. 985 (1906) ; Moore v. Layton, 147 Md. 244, 127 Atl.
756 (1925). (2) That possession and enjoyment by the grantee is merely postponed.
Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 Ill. 636, 45 N. E. 565 (1896) ; Trumbauer v. Rust, 36 S. D.
.301,
154 N. W. 801 (1915) ; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251, 31 S. E. 986 (1898).
3
Compare McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465
(1909)
with Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925).
4
1f the beneficiary is not to be determined until after the death of the settlor the trust
may be invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition of the beneficial interest in the
property, with no interest to vest prior to the settlor's death. McGillivray v. First Nat'l
Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927) ; Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E.
257 (1887); Syracuse Trust Co. v. Fuller, 140 Misc. 918, 252 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup.
Ct. 1930). On the other hand, if the beneficiary acquires an interest during the lifetime
.of the settlor the Statute of Wills is not violated even if possession and enjoyment are
postponed until after the settlor's death. Moreover, the interest of the beneficiary may
be5 vested or contingent. Thomas v. Williams, 105 Minn. 88, 117 N. W. 155 (1908).
See, for example § 166 INT. REv. CODE, 53 STAr. 68 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 166 (1940)
and Note (1940) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 133.
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the possessor becomes merely an agent of the owner and the attempted disposition is testamentary. 6 But if the settlor delivers title to the trustee and
reserves to himself merely the life income from the property, the transfer
is not testamentary even though the ultimate beneficiary will not get possession or enjoyment until after the settlor's death. 7 Though an attempted gift,
not in trust, is generally held to be invalid if a power of revocation is retained
by the donor,8 it is settled law that a gift in trust is not invalidated by such
a reservation. 9 Nor does the reservation of a life estate coupled with a
power to revoke the trust render the trust invalid as testamentary for if the
ultimate remainderman is in being he at once acquires an interest in the
property even though it may later be divested should the settlor exercise his
reserved power. 10 It has been held further that the reservation of the power
to alter and amend the provisions of the deed of trust, even to the extent of
changing the beneficiaries, does not cause the inter vivos trust to violate the
Statute of Wills. 1 Moreover, a combination of all the rights and powers
specifically mentioned heretofore
may be reserved by the settlor with the
2
same legal consequence.1

The courts have had more difficulty in upholding trusts where the settlor
has reserved a life interest, a power to revoke, the right to alter and amend,
the right to withdraw securities from the trust corpus, as well as the right
to direct the trustee concerning the sale or retention of trust properties, or
01 ScoTt ON TRUSTS § 56.1 (1939) and cases cited at p. 328, n. 6. See also Coon v.
Stanley, 230 Mo. App. 524, 94 S. W. (2d) 96 (1936) ; In re Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa.
554, 190 Atl. 906 (1937).
7Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 198 Pac. 712 (1921) ; Candee v. Conn. Say. Bank,
S1 Conn. 372, 71 At. 551 (1908) ; Lauterbach v. New York Investment Co., 62 Misc.
561, 117 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 137 App. Div. 919, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1137
(1st Dep't 1910); Brace v. Van Eps, 13 S. D. 452, 80 N. W. 197 (1899) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 57 (1).
SBarnum, Ex'r v. Reed, 136 Ill. 388, 26 N. E. 572 (1891) ; Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind.
451, 10 Am. Rep. 118 (1872) ; Calvin v. Free, 66 Kan. 466, 71 Pac. 823 (1903) ; Bickford
v. Mattocks, 95 Me. 547, 50 At. 894 (1901) ; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212, 26 Am.
Rep. 577 (1877) ; Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, 15 Atl. 470 (1888).
9
Hall v. Birkhaur, 59 Ala. 349 (1877) ; Brown v. Findlay Trust Co., 126 Md. 175,
94 At. 523 (1915) ; Stone v. Hacket, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 227 (1858) ; Pingrey v. Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374, 11 N. E. 562 (1887) ; Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 53
N. E. 823 (1899) ; Hiserodt v. Hamlett, 74 Miss. 37, 20 So. 143 (1896) ; In re Estate
of Soulard, 141 Mo. 642, 43 S. W. 617 (1897) ; Robb v. Wash. & Jeff. College, 185
N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906); Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 49, 10 N. E. 257
(1891); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 57 (1).
30 Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929);
Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 Iowa 423, 106 N. W. 914 (1906) ; Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915) ; Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904) ;
Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925) ; Goodrich v. City
National Bank & Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258 N. W. 253 (1935) ; Von Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114, 32 N. E. 615 (1892) ; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809
(1891) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 57 (1).
11Stone v. Hackett, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 227 (1858) ; Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 228,
70 N. E. 89 (1904) ; Goodrich v. City National Bank and Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258
N. W. 253 (1935) ; Robb v. Wash. & Jeff. College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906) ;
Pinckney v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., et al., 249 App. Div. 375, 292 N. Y. Supp.
835 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. (2d) 627

(1938).
2

' See cases cited supra note 11.
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the additional power to veto a proposed sale or investment deemed advisable by the trustee. Clearly, in such a trust, we are approaching rather
closely to the equivalent of absolute ownership in the settlor, and numerous
cases hold that the reservation of so much control renders the attempted
ultimate disposition of the property testamentary and is invalid 3unless executed according to the law governing testamentary dispositions.'
The great majority of our courts are very liberal in sustaining the validity
of trusts wherein the settlor has reserved all or substantially all of these
rights and powers. The decisions are based on the theory that title has passed
to the trustee and the beneficiaries have taken an immediate interest in the
trust property with the settlor's reserved powers amounting to conditions
subsequent which operate merely to divest their interest. Furthermore, there
is usually an express finding that the settlor had a bona fide intention to create
an inter vivos trust and intended to insure certain beneficiaries of his bounty
by setting up safeguards against future contingencies. 14 In those cases where
' 3 Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P. (2d) 797 (1935) ; Smith v. Simmons, 99
Colo. 227, 61 P. (2d) 589 (1936) ; Coston v. Portland Trust Co., 131 Ore. 71, 278 Pac.
586 (1929); Warasco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829
(1924) (here the trustee alone had discretion as to investments, but trust was held
invalid).
The RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (1935) § 57 (2) provides:
"Where the settlor transfers property in trust and reserves not only a beneficial
life estate and power to revoke but also such power to control the trustee as to the
details of the administration of the trust that the trustee is the agent of the settlor,
the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his death is testamentary
and is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes relating to the validity of wills
are complied with."
At best this is an unworkable test since it usually has the effect of requiring the
highest court of each state to be burdened with the ultimate decision on the question of
control in every case where an inter vivos trust is assailed as testamentary in the trial
court.
14Pres. of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (N. D. Cal. 1896) (reserved power
to revoke, modify and substitute); Adams v. Hagerott, 34 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 8th
1929) (right to advise investments); Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110
Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929) (broad general powers of control); Kelley v. Parker,
181 Ill.
49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899) (reserved power to sell and manage) ; Bear v. Milliken
Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349, 73 A. L. R. 173 (1929) (general control reserved
over investments); Keck v. McKinsty, 206 Ia. 1121, 291 N. W. 851 (1928); Goodrich
v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, -258 N. W. 253 (1935) (power to
alter and amend, revoke, withdraw part of corpus, control all investments); Sims v.
Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158 S.W. 624 (1913); Pinckney v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
249 App. Div. 375, 292 N. Y. Supp. 835 (3d Dep't 1937) (reserved right to revoke and
modify, direct retention and sale of securities and add and substitute securities) ; Talbot
v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, 78 AtI. 535 (veto power'over any sales of trust securities).
In McEvoy v. Boston ]Eive Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465 (1909)
the settlor placed certain money in trust and reserved the right to withdraw any sums
as she might demand during her life and at her death to pay the balance to certain
named persons. The trust was held invalid. In Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251
Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925) the settlor reserved a life income, power to alter and
amend, and right to demand parts of the principal but the trust was held valid. The
McEvoy case was distinguished on the sole ground that there the trustee had no discretion in the premises and was a mere agent, while in the Jones case the trustee had power
over investments, etc. Undoubtedly the court in the McEvoy case was influenced by the
fact that there was evidence to the effect that the settlor had expressed herself as having
made the trust agreement instead of a will.
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the settlor reserved the right to withdraw parts of the corpus of the trust a
few courts have held that this factor makes a gift to remaindermen testamentary, 1 but it seems far more reasonable to hold that the right of withdrawal is not essentially different from a power to revoke the whole trust
which is generally accepted as a valid provision.'6 Of course, the court may
hold that a trust, otherwise valid under the doctrines already discussed, is
invalid as an illusory transfer in the nature of a fraud on the settlor's widow's
statutory right of election; in such cases different principles of law are
controlling. 17
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in recent years, has had occasion to deal with
the problem under discussion and the state of the Ohio law today is not
altogether clear. In Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, the Supreme Court, in
an opinion not officially reported, held a trust invalid as testamentary, primarily on the ground that the settlor had reserved the power to revoke the
trust. In its later officially reported opinion' 8 the court sustained the validity
of the trust on the basis of a recent statute 9 which it deemed controlling.
The court, however, maintained, as it had in the opinion not officially reported,
that as a common law proposition the reservation of a power to revoke invalidated the trust. The view expressed in the Hawkins case was dearly
contrary to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions
at the time 0 and
21
has been subsequently discredited by the same court.
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. White,22 the settlor of the trust in question
reserved the life income from the trust, the right to use the real property,
certain stock voting rights, and the power to revoke, alter and modify the
trust if the directors of the corporate trustee acquiesced. The trustee apparently had full control over investments and reinvestments. Provision was
made for ultimate remaindermen after the settlor's death. The Supreme Court
held that the trust was not testamentary and set forth certain guiding principles for future cases dealing with the same problem.2
The court, how15Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213 (1903) ; Darling v. Mattoon State Bank,
189 Wis. 117, 207 N. W. 254 (1926). Cf. McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank,
supra
note 14.
16 Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 At. 139, 73 A. L. R.
201 (1929) ; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 14; Goodrich v. National Bank
& Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258 N. W. 253 (1935) ; Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451,
2 N. E. 464 (1885) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1. 15 N. E. (2d) 627

(1938).
17 Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937), Note (1937) 23 CORNELL
L. Q. 457.
18121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N. E. 389 (192 ).
19 OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 8617.
20
See cases cited supra note 9.

21Cleveland
Trust
22
Supra note 21.
23

Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. (2d) 627 (1938).

The principles enumerated by the court are supported by the great weight of authority. See cases cited supra note 14. The court said, 134 Ohio St. at 6, 7: "By the weight of
authority, a trust, otherwise effective, is not rendered nugatory because the settlor reserves to himself the following rights and powers: (1) The use of the property and the
income therefrom for life; (2) the supervision and direction of investments and reinvestments; (3) the amendment or modification of the trust agreement; (4) the revocation
of the trust in whole or in part; (5) the consumption of principal." The court further
stated, 134 Ohio St. at 9: "It is evident that cases of the type now under consideration
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ever, placed great weight on the fact that the settlor could not revoke, alter
or modify the trust without the consent of the trustee.
In Schofield v. Union Trst Ca.,24 the settlor conveyed a parcel of real
estate to the trustee and reserved the right to receive the income therefrom
for life. The trustee was required to secure the settlor's consent to all sales
and purchases of property connected with the trust. The settlor reserved
an absolute power to revoke the trust and he had 'also designated the ultimate
remaindermen. The Supreme Court, by a divided court, sustained the validity
of this trust and relied entirely on the principles enunciated in the White case
in so holding. The court emphasized that the settlor had a bona fide intention to create a trust and perhaps this is the crux of the decision. If so, it
goes about as far as any court has gone in sustaining such a trust since the
court admitted that the trustee had "little or nothing to do with its management." But the importance of the Schofield case is that it clearly shows that
the White case is a more sweeping decision than a superficial reading of the
opinion discloses, and it will not be limited to its own peculiar facts.2 5
The most recent case to come before the Ohio Supreme Court, on the topic
under discussion, is Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio St. 50, 38 N. E.
(2d) 185 (1941). For our purposes, the essential facts were as follows: In
1910 S executed a trust instrument and by its terms he transferred certain
securities to a trustee to hold, manage, sell, invest and reinvest as the settlor
should direct. S reserved the right to withdraw any securities he desired
from the trust, as well as an absolute power of revocation and a life interest
in the income. He also indicated the manner in which the trust should be
administered after his death. S died in 1911 without having revoked the
trust and from that time until this case arose the subsequent beneficiaries
had been receiving the income and no one had heretofore contested the validity
of the trust. Three judges concurred in sustaining the validity of the trust,
one judge concurred in the result but refused to discuss validity on its merits
because he felt that the pleadings had not raised the issue, and three judges
dissented in an opinion declaring the trust invalid. The opinion sustaining
the validity of the trust relied upon the White and Schofield cases and expressly concluded that the settlor had a bona fide intention to create an inter
vivos trust. This conclusion was clearly justified since the settlor in the Watt
case had retained no more incidents of control than had been enumerated in
the White case as permissive.2 6 It is clear that the control exercised by the
settlor was for the benefit of the trust and its beneficiaries, and not for his
own individual interest as owner of the fund. The three dissenting judges
maintained that the reservations of rights and powers were such that the
trustee became a mere agent of the settlor, citing the White case. It is
must be decided on their own particular facts. Where the settlor retains powers which
in their cumulative effect amount to ownership of the trust estate with. such control over
the administrative functions of the trustea as to make him simply the settlor's representative, no trust is established and the courts have so declared."
24135
Ohio St. 328, 21 N. E. (2d) 119 (1939).
25
1t is now clear that the fact in the White case that the trustee had to consent to
the settlor's exercise of the power to revoke, alter, or amend was not felt to be controlling
in the outcome of the case.
2
6Sutpra note 23.
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difficult to perceive how they could read that part of the White case which
enumerated five permissible reservations of rights and powers 27 and still
maintain that this settlor had stepped beyond them. They did not question
the settlor's bona; fide intention to create a trust, on which the prevailing
opinion was in part based. How one judge could concur with the majority
in the Schofield case and then unqualifiedly dissent in the principal case is
not readily understandable.
In order to clarify an important principle of property law -for the benefit
of Ohio practitioners engaged in drafting trust instruments for the future,
it would seem that the whole court should adopt the rules of the White and
Schofield cases in the spirit of liberality with which they were written.28
The law of Ohio today is based on the principles as stated in the White case,
and they should be construed broadly whenever the court finds a boiza fide
intention on the part of the settlor to create an express inter vivos trust which
conveys a present interest, vested or contingent, to the ultimate beneficiaries
who are special objects of the settlor's bounty. When such an intention is
found it seems clear that the Ohio court will uphold the trust however ministerial the functions of the trustee may prove to be.
Donald R. Harter
27Supra note 23.

28Moreover, these cases do not establish an unorthodox rule. On the contrary they do
not go beyond the rules already established in courts of other jurisdictions. See cases
cited supra note 14, especially Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E.
716 (1925) and Goodrich v. City National Bank and Trust Co., 270 Mich 222, 258 N. W.
253 (1935).

